Abstract-The impact of information dissemination on epidemic control essentially affects individual behaviors. Among the information-driven behaviors, vaccination is determined by the cost-related factors, and the correlation with information dissemination is not clear yet. To this end, we present a model to integrate the information-epidemic spread process into an evolutionary vaccination game in multiplex networks, and explore how the spread of information on epidemic influences the vaccination behavior. We propose a two-layer coupled susceptible-alertinfected-susceptible (SAIS) model on a multiplex network, where the strength coefficient is defined to characterize the tendency and intensity of information dissemination. By means of the evolutionary game theory, we get the equilibrium vaccination level (the evolutionary stable strategy) for the vaccination game. After exploring the influence of the strength coefficient on the equilibrium vaccination level, we reach a counter-intuitive conclusion that more information transmission cannot promote vaccination. Specifically, when the vaccination cost is within a certain range, increasing information dissemination even leads to a decline in the equilibrium vaccination level. Moreover, we study the influence of the strength coefficient on the infection density and social cost, and unveil the role of information dissemination in controlling the epidemic with numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The epidemic control has attracted much attentions since the outbreak and propagate of virus may cause tremendous damage and bring huge (economic) losses [1] - [4] . Various models, such as the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model [5] and the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model [6] , have been used to describe the epidemic spreading process. With the understanding of the disease-behavior dynamics, researches are no longer limited to study the epidemic dynamics by means of such models [7] - [9] . The individual behaviors reducing the susceptibility to infection, such as wearing masks and washing hands can be triggered by the awareness (information) diffusion. Funk et al. [10] studied how the awareness impacts the virus propagation in a well-mixed population, and found that the awareness diffusion can lead to a lower size of the outbreak, but cannot affect the epidemic threshold. Similarly, Wu et al. [11] explored the impact of three different kinds of awareness on the epidemic spread in a scale-free networked population. However, single-layer networks provide a limited representation of complex systems [12] . The efforts in [10] , [11] may fail to involve the realistic scenario where the Recently, multiplex networks representing social interactions at different contexts, such as information diffusion and epidemic propagation in different layers (of networks), have received increasing attention [13] - [17] . The interactions between layers may create the outcomes that go beyond what isolated layers can capture [18] . Granell et al. [19] proposed an unaware-aware-unaware (UAU)-susceptible-infectedsusceptible (SIS) dynamics in the multiplex network composed of a virtual contact network and a physical contact network to understand the interplay between the spread of awareness and epidemic. Unlike the assumption that both the awareness and epidemic spread processes have the same dynamics in [19] , Guo et al. [20] introduced a threshold model to describe the awareness cascade phenomenon of human awareness. However, they both assumed that the awareness individuals are completely immune to the infection, that is, each individual chooses vaccination in response to the information. In reality, behavioral adoption or response, especially vaccination, is a complex process that has been demonstrated by many researches [21] - [23] . On the one hand, vaccination is considered as one of the most effective and protective behaviors (strategies) against virus propagation [24] - [26] . On the other hand, vaccination usually comes at a cost, and the decision of an individual on vaccination depends not only on his trade-off on costs, but also on the strategies of other individuals. Vaccination presents a social dilemma since a selfinterested individual expects to benefit from the vaccinating behavior of others [27] - [30] . Therefore, understanding the relation between the information dissemination and individuals vaccination behavior is critical to epidemic control.
In this paper, we propose a two-layer coupled SAIS model to describe the spread process in a multiplex network, which is composed of an information layer and a contact layer. In order to reflect the individuals' reaction to the information regarding to the epidemic, we introduce an alert state (A) with information attributes, and assume that the alerted individuals are less likely to be infected than the susceptible individuals. We find that different behavioral responses to information have different impacts on epidemic spread. Taking into account the interactions between individuals' decision-making in vaccination, we construct an evolutionary vaccination game by integrating the information-epidemic dynamical process into the evolutionary dynamics, and explore the role of the information dissemination on vaccination. Moreover, we investigate the impact factors on social cost with numerical simulations.
The rest of this paper is presented as follows. Section II formulates the problem of this paper. Section III presents the two-layer coupled SAIS model and theoretically and numerically analyse the epidemic dynamics. Section IV introduces the evolutionary vaccination game in the multiplex network. Section V presents the performance of vaccination against the epidemic propagation and the role analysis of information. Section VI concludes the whole paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION Vaccination is an effective and preventive strategy against epidemic propagation. Since the information and epidemic spread simultaneously, individuals can learn about the epidemic by receiving risk information from their infected neighbors, in addition to being infected. Researches on the relationship between information dissemination and vaccination has attracted much attentions. The qualitative analysis of the effect of information dissemination on vaccination behaviors cannot reach a unified conclusion. An individual with epidemic information does not necessarily choose vaccination. Subsequently, Xia and Liu [26] proposed a belief-based model to study the impact factors of vaccination decisions of individuals. However, individuals' costs, related to the social cost that is one of the most important control goals in vaccinating epidemic, are not taken into account. Note that it is generally assumed that individuals are self-interested and pursue the minimized costs. An individual's vaccination decision depends not only on his trade-off on costs but also on the strategies of other individuals, since vaccination contributes to the herd immunity, protecting the individuals who do not vaccinate from being infected. The correlation between the information dissemination and vaccination determines the vaccination level that affects the social cost. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an evolutionary vaccination game by integrating the informationepidemic spread process into the process of strategic selection and interaction, to explore how the information dissemination influences the vaccination. Moreover, we show the social cost and infection density as a function of the vaccination level to explore the role of vaccination in epidemic control, and study the impact of the strength coefficient on the equilibrium vaccination level with numerical simulations.
The model (as illustrated in Fig. 1 ) includes two stages: decision-making stage (stage 1) and spreading stage (stage 2). Such a model is suitable for describing seasonal diseases, such as the influenza, and vaccination is usually available before a predicted outbreak. During stage 2 (epidemic season) the epidemic and information of the epidemic propagate simultaneously at the corresponding layer, which is modeled by the two-layer coupled SAIS model presented in section III. Each node (individual) unilaterally decides whether to get vaccinated during stage 1, which is modeled by the vaccination game that occurs before the start of stage 2. We assume that vaccination is completely effective during one epidemic season. That is to say, a vaccinated individual will not be infected and no longer get involved in the next epidemic season, while the unvaccinated individuals have a risk of being infected. When the epidemic process reaches the steady state, each individual will adjust his vaccination decision for the next epidemic season. Fig. 1 . The schematic of our model in a multiplex network. This network includes two layers, the upper layer corresponds to a network where the epidemic information spreads, and the lower one on which the epidemic propagates. It is assumed that a proportion x of individuals labeled by V, chooses to be vaccinated at stage 1. At stage 2, vaccinated individuals are no longer involved in the epidemiological process which is described by the twolayer coupled SAIS model, while unvaccinated individuals are at risk of being infected. When the epidemiological process reaches the stationary state, each individual adjust his decision on whether to vaccinate for the next epidemic season according to his current cost and state.
III. THE SAIS SEASONAL EPIDEMICS WITHOUT VACCINATION
In this part, we first introduce the coupled SAIS model and analyse the spread process via the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA). Then, we perform simulations to verify the theoretical results and show some dynamics properties.
A two-layer multiplex network with different network topologies are shown in Fig. 1 . The information layer and contact layer have the same number of nodes and the size is N . Each node (individual) in one layer has its counterpart node in another layer. We define a strength coefficient α that captures the tendency and intensity of information dissemination. Specifically, α = 1 indicates that the information layer vanishes and only the epidemic propagates in the contact layer, that is the case discussed in a single-layer network. When 0 < α < 1, the spread processes of information and epidemic coexist. Therefore, the strength coefficient also represents the coupling strength of the information-epidemic dynamics.
In the coupled SAIS model, each node has three possible states, susceptible (S), alert (A) or infected (I). In the information layer, a susceptible node i with degree k i can perceive the risk information of virus from its infected neighbors, and be converted to an alert node. Without loss of generality, we assume that an alert node may ignore or not to care about this risk information, and becomes a susceptible node with a rate η. In the contact layer, an infected node infects its susceptible and alert neighbours with infection rates β and β A , respectively, where β A = ξβ. Taking into account the complexity of individual decision-making behaviour in reality, we consider that the alert state is different from the immune state, which means 0 < ξ ≤ 1. Each infected node recovers with rate µ.
Let p S i (t), p A i (t) and p I i (t) denote the probabilities for node i of being susceptible, alert and infected at time t, respectively. We assume that each node has the same sensitivity λ to the risk information. For a susceptible node, the probability of being Fig. 2 . Transition probability diagrams for susceptible (S), alert (A) and infected (I) states of the coupled SAIS propagation dynamics. Both susceptible and alert nodes can be infected by their infected neighbors, and the difference is that alert nodes have information while the susceptible nodes do not. q S i denotes the transition probability for susceptible individual i not being infected by the neighbours, q A i denotes the transition probability for alert individual i not being infected by the neighbours, θ i denotes the transition probability for susceptible individual i being informed by the infected neighbours, µ denotes the transition probability from infected to susceptible, η denotes the transition probability from alerted to susceptible, and α denotes the strength factor.
an alerted node is denoted by
, where a ji is the element of adjacency matrix of the information layer, and a ji = 1 if there is a link between nodes i and j. Denote the transition probability for node i not being infected by the neighbours if i is a susceptible node as q S i (t), not being infected by the neighbours if i is an alert node as q A i (t), and the element of adjacency matrix of the contact layer as b ji , we have
( 1) With above definitions and the scheme presented in Fig. 2 , the evolution of the different states' probabilities for node i can be described by utilizing the microscopic Markov chain approach [19] as below:
we obtain the infection probability of node i in the stationary state,
. Thus, the infection density ρ I can be computed as
We compare ρ I obtained by Eq. (5) and Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to evaluate the analytical result. Simulations are performed in two-layer ER networks and two-layer BA scale-free networks, where different network sizes (each layer with the same size) and strength coefficients are taken into account to illustrate the applicability of the model. In a multiplex network with two layers, the topology of each layer is different. For instance, the contact layer of a two-layer BA scale-free network has a power law degree distribution with exponent 3, and the information layer is the same network with some extra random links. Fig. 3 shows that the infection density ρ I performs as a function of the infection rate β. When the infection rate β exceeds a certain value, i.e., the epidemic threshold β c , the epidemic outbreaks and the final infection density increases with the increase of the infection rate.
When β → β c , the probability satisfies 0 ≤ p Let φ i = p I i , combining Eq. (3) with Eq. (6) and omitting the second-order terms of φ, we obtain
Further, Eq. (7) can be reduced to
where ǫ ji is the element of the identify matrix. Eq. 
where ∆ max (K) is the largest eigenvalue of matrix K. Obviously, it depends not only on the structure of the information layer and the dynamics of the information, but also on the strength coefficient. 4 illustrates the impacts of the strength coefficient α on the epidemic threshold β c . We find that the epidemic threshold decreases with the increase of α, regardless of the network topology. Moreover, the value of epidemic threshold calculated by Eq. (9) is in agreement with that obtained by the MC simulations in a two-layer ER network and a two-layer BA scale-free network, respectively. In terms of the infection density and epidemic threshold, we conclude that there is the good agreement between the MMCA method and Monte Carlo simulations no matter what network sizes and strength coefficients are. The result of this comparison indicates the validity of our model.
Besides the strength coefficient, the network size also influences the value of ρ I and β c . Fig. 5 shows that epidemic threshold decreases with the increase of the network size. In terms of the infection density, it depends on not only the network size but also the infection rate. Meanwhile, different network structures display different results. For the two-layer ER network (see Fig. 5 (a) ), when the network size and infection rate exceed a certain value (N > 35, β > 0.6), both the network size and the infection rate will no longer affect the infection density. For a two-layer BA scale-free network, the network size only works when the infection rate β < 0.4. When β ≥ 0.4, the infection rate plays a leading role where the network size does not affect the infection density.
In order to reveal the role of behavioral response of the alert individual who has the information attribute, we investigate the impact of coefficient ξ on the propagation dynamics. As illustrated in Fig. 5 (c) , the value of ξ does not affect the epidemic threshold, but it affects the infection density, and the extent of the impact is related to the value range of ξ. When ξ > 0.3, the changes in ξ will have no effect. When ξ → 0, all the alerted individuals are immune to the infection as the assumption in [19] , and the final infection density is greatly reduced. However, the information dissemination cannot promote the vaccination behavior for each individual in reality.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY VACCINATION GAME
In this part, we first introduce the vaccination game to describe the interactions between the individuals strategies in a multiplex network, and show the vaccination dynamics under the framework of evolutionary game theory (EGT). For the network with two layers, although different layers represent social interactions at different contexts, the strategic choice of an individual in one layer may affect those in the other layer. For simplicity, we assume that each node and its counterpart node have the same strategy during the same round.
The decision of an individual may be affected by many factors due to the interactions in the underlying infection process. We consider that there exists the communication cost T , since the epidemic information diffusions in the information layer. In order to promote vaccination, we assume that an individual choosing non-vaccination has the communication cost while the vaccinated individual (V ) does not. An individual choosing vaccination has the vaccination cost C, and vaccination is completely effective so that a vaccinated individual does not participate in the information-epidemic process. In addition to the communication cost, a non-vaccinated individual being infected has the infection cost H. Considering that an individual's strategy plays a role in both layers, we assume that the cost of an individual is determined by the sum of the costs of two layers. The cost of individual i in a two-layer coupled network is denoted by
where m s = 1 if individual i chooses to be vaccinated, otherwise, m s = 0, and v i = 1 or 0 indicates whether individual i is infected or not. Without loss of generality, we assume that cost C of an vaccinated individual is less than cost H. Meanwhile, an unvaccinated individual may benefit from his vaccinated neighbours without be infected, resulting in a social dilemma. Hence, we have the following condition
Supposing that a proportion x of the individuals chooses to be vaccinated initially, the infection rate becomes (1−x)β during the epidemic season [31] . Let ρ I (x) denote the infection density for the network. The average payoff of the vaccinated individuals P v and the unvaccinated individuals P uv are as follows,
1−x is the ratio of the number of infected individuals to that of unvaccinated individuals. The infection density
where p I i (x) is the infection probability for node i in the stationary state, which can be obtained in section III. The social cost of the whole network can be calculated by
The optimal value of x that minimizes the social cost is the herd immunity threshold x c . We will discuss the factors that may influence the social cost and herd immunity threshold x c in section V. We here consider a game with N individuals, where each individual has two strategies, vaccination (cooperation) or nonvaccination (defection), the strategy profile is denoted by S = {S c , S d }, and the set of mixed strategies is denoted by ∆S = {p| Si∈S p i = 1}. It is worth noting that a mixed strategy p can be understood as a distribution of the pure strategies of all individuals. Each individual randomly selects its neighbors to interact in the network. Denote the expected cost of an individual adopting p against an opponent playing q as U (p, q), where p , q ∈ ∆S. Definition. Suppose that the whole population uses strategy p, and a fraction ǫ of mutations adopts strategy q. Strategy p is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [32] if ∀q = p, there exists someǫ q > 0 such that ∀ǫ ∈ (0,ǫ q ):
Since this strict inequality states that an ESS is robust to any small deviation of the whole population, the equilibrium definition of ESS is stronger than the Nash equilibrium which only concerns the deviations of an individual. We study the vaccination dynamics and predict individuals vaccinating behavior through pairwise interactions in the twolayer coupled network. Once the spreading process ends, each individual updates his strategy for the next epidemic season. We adopt the Fermi rule [33] for the strategy updating. At each round, individual i randomly selects neighbour j in the information layer, compares their costs, and learns strategy of individual j with the following probability,
where S i and S j correspond to the strategy of individual i and j, respectively. Parameter k represents the selection intensity, measuring how much the selection depends on the cost difference. Note that the change of the number of the vaccinated individuals is due to the pairwise interaction (comparison) between the vaccinated individuals and unvaccinated individuals. The evolutionary vaccination dynamics [34] , [35] can be approximated byẋ = (β/2)x(P v −P ), whereP = xP v + (1 − x)P uv is the average payoff. We get the transformed dynamics of vaccination frequency as
For simplicity, let H = 1, the vaccination cost C ∈ [0, 1), Eq. (17) can be simplified as
Theorem. In a multiplex network composed of homogeneous networks with size N , the cost of vaccination and communication are C and T , where C, T ∈ [0, 1), respectively. For the pairwise interaction process, if
The equilibria of Eq. (18) are given by x = 0, x = 1, and x * ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
Note that f (x) decreases with x, until x reaches the herd immunity threshold x c . If
Based on the stability criterion of the equilibrium [36] , we conclude that the interior equilibrium x * is stable, satisfying the equation
In summary, we show the condition that the ESS x * satisfies in our evolutionary vaccination game. The theoretical analysis results show that the ESS depends not only on the game parameters (C and T ) but also on the strength coefficient ξ. Moreover, for a fixed x * , combining Eqs. (13) and (14), we can obtain the corresponding infection density and social cost of the whole network.
V. VACCINATION PERFORMANCE AND ROLE ANALYSIS OF

INFORMATION
In this section, we investigate the vaccination performance against epidemic propagation under the influence of information dissemination.
Different behaviors responding to the epidemic information have different effects on the epidemic propagation. In order to study the performance of vaccination in epidemic control, we consider that there is a proportion x of the individuals chooses to be vaccinated initially in a two-layer ER network with size N = 100 and explore the impacts of vaccination on the infection density and social cost. We fix the recovery rate µ = 0.45, vaccination cost C = 0.4, communication cost T = 0.1 and ξ = 0.5. Fig. 6 shows that the social cost and infection density ρ I as a function of the vaccination level x, respectively. We find that there exists a critical point of x, the so-called herd immunity threshold x c . When x < x c , the social cost and infection density decrease with the increase of x, when x > x c , the social cost increases and infection density equals to 0. Therefore, the herd immunity results in the minimal social cost. In addition to the vaccination level, the strength coefficient has an influence on the social cost and infection density. As illustrated in Fig. 6 (a) and (c), when the vaccination level is less than the herd immunity threshold, the social cost with a smaller strength coefficient (SCSS) is less than the one with a larger strength coefficient (SCLS). Otherwise, the SCSS is larger than the SCLS. Moreover, the difference between the SCSS and SCLS decreases with the increase of the vaccination level. It is worth noting that the strength coefficient has no effect on the herd immunity threshold. The herd immunity threshold changes as the infection rate changes. Fig. 6 (b) shows that the herd immunity threshold corresponding to a lower infection rate is less than the one corresponding to a larger one. In summary, for a fixed vaccination cost, when the vaccination level is less than the herd immunity threshold, more information results in less social cost and infection density, i.e., contributing to epidemic control. We now perform simulations on a two-layer ER network to verify the analytical result obtained in section IV. For a fixed communication cost T = 0.1, Fig. 7 (a) shows the equilibrium vaccination level x * as a function of the vaccination cost C under the influence of information dissemination (α = 0.8).
The solid line is calculated by Eq. (19) . We find that there is a good agreement between the analytical solutions and numerical simulation results, and the equilibrium vaccination level x * decreases with the increase of the vaccination cost C. The introduction of vaccination affects the epidemic propagation. Figs. 7 (b) and (c) illustrate that as the equilibrium vaccination level increases, the infection density decreases regardless of the network structure. In addition, the corresponding social cost declines with the infection density decreases, as shown in the insets. Therefore, we conclude that the increase of equilibrium vaccination level can effectively reduce the infection density and social cost, and help to control the spread of the epidemic.
How to improve the equilibrium vaccination level motivates us to explore the impact factor of vaccination. For a fixed vaccination cost, we compare the equilibrium vaccination level at different strength coefficients to determine the effect of information dissemination intensity on vaccination decision. Simulations are performed in a two-layer ER network and a two-layer BA scale-free network, respectively. As illustrated in Figs. 8 (a) and 9 (a) , when the vaccination cost is relatively large (C > 0.7) or small (C < 0.4 in Fig. 8 (a) and C < 0.2 in Fig. 9 (a) ), the change of the strength coefficient has no effect on the equilibrium vaccination level. However, when C ∈ (0.4, 0.7) in Fig. 8 (a) and C ∈ (0.2, 0.7) in Fig. 9 (a), the vaccination level declines with the decrease of the strength coefficient α. In other words, when the vaccination cost is within a certain range, the increase in the intensity of information transmission leads to a decline in the equilibrium vaccination level, i.e., the equilibrium vaccination level is negatively correlated with information dissemination.
For the corresponding infection density, Figs. 8 (b) and 9 (b) show that with the increase of the vaccination cost, the infection density increases. While the vaccination cost C > 0.7, the effect disappears, and the infection density does not change with the vaccination cost. Similar to the procedure of x * , we fix the value of C and compare the infection density at the different value of α. We find that when the vaccination cost is relatively small, the change of the strength coefficient has no effect on the infection density as well. When the vaccination cost is within a certain range, the infection density influenced by the lower strength coefficient is higher than that influenced by the larger strength coefficient, which means that information dissemination is not conducive to reduce the infection density. When the vaccination cost is relatively large, the opposite is true, and information dissemination can reduce the infection density. In terms of the social cost, only when the vaccination cost exceeds a certain value (C > 0.7), the change of the strength coefficient has an impact on the equilibrium social cost (see Figs. 8 (c) and 9 (c) ). As the strength coefficient increases, the equilibrium social cost increases. In general, the effect of the information dissemination on the vaccination and epidemic control depends on the vaccination cost. When the vaccination cost is within a certain range, reducing information dissemination can promote vaccination and reduce the infection density.
VI. CONCLUSION
Individuals' behavioral responses to information dissemination determine its influence on epidemic control. Increasing the vaccination level can reduce the infection density and social cost. Taking into account the complexity of individuals' decision-making in vaccination, we have presented a two-stage model by incorporating the information-epidemic propagation process into the vaccination dynamics, and explored the influence of information dissemination on vaccination. The impact of strength coefficient on the equilibrium vaccination level reveals that more information transmission cannot promote vaccination. Information dissemination is negatively correlated with vaccination when the vaccination cost is within a certain range. Although more information dissemination can increase the epidemic threshold, it cannot improve the equilibrium vaccination level and reduce the infection density and social cost. Since information dissemination is inevitable during the epidemic, this correlation may provide a guidance for the authorities to implement information regulation for epidemic control.
